Considering coalition structures formed by an external licensor of a patented technology and oligopolistic firms, we investigate licensing agreements that can be reached as the bargaining outcomes under those coalition structures. The cores for coalition structures are empty, unless the grand coalition forms. We give the necessary and sufficient condition for the core (for the grand coalition) being non-empty. If the number of licensees that maximizes their total surplus is greater than the number of existing non-licensees, each symmetric bargaining set for a coalition structure is a singleton and the optimal number of licensees that maximizes the licensor's revenue is uniquely determined.
Introduction: Licensing and Bargaining
This paper investigates licensing agreements that can be reached as results of negotiations among an external licensor of a patented technology and oligopolistic firms, and aims to provide some implications on how many licenses the licensor should sell to firms through such negotiations.
Patent licensing problems in oligopolistic markets had been studied only by non-cooperative mechanisms; upfront fee or royalty in Tauman (1984, 1986) , and auction in Shapiro (1985, 1986) . After these seminal papers, the main concern of researchers was focused on the optimal licensing mechanism that maximizes the licensor's revenue from a patented technology (See, e.g., Kamien, Oren and Tauman (1992) , Muto (1993) , Sen (2005) and Sen and Tauman (2007) ). On the other hand, licensing agreements are basically contract terms signed by licensors and licensees as negotiation results. This paper hence seeks into the original and practical viewpoint and studies patent licensing as bargaining outcomes. 1 
On this agenda, Tauman and Watanabe (2007, hereafter TW) recently
provided the licensor's payoff in the non-cooperative auction game with an interpretation from a cooperative viewpoint. Their analysis was, however, limited to the asymptotic equivalence. In practice, however, each industry has a finite number of firms operating there. For such a finite industry, Driessen, Muto and Nakayama (1992, hereafter DMN) studied a cooperative game on information trading which is similar to patent licensing. Their concern was, however, confined to payoff distributions in the grand coalition (i.e., every player shares the information). To consider the number of licenses that most benefits the licensor, we need to extend their approach.
We hence study coalition structures formed by an external licensor of a patented technology and firms operating in oligopolistic markets and licensing agreements reached as the bargaining outcomes under those coalition structures. For this aim, we consider cooperative solutions for games with coalition structures, where no sidepayments among coalitions are allowed as in Aumann and Drèze (1974) and the references therein. A key is how to define the worth of each coalition, i.e., characteristic function. Watanabe and Tauman (2003, hereafter WT) proposed a sophisticated definition under a subtle mixture of conflict and cooperation: licensees can form a cartel S to enhance their oligopolistic power, whereas non-licensees may react also by forming some cartels. Then, the licensees in S might not merge into a single entity, but gather as a group of smaller subcartels in S. Firms can there merge or acquire the others freely. 3 In contrast to WT, we here prohibit firms from forming any cartel in the market. This is the assumption to consider the same situation as analyzed with non-cooperative mechanisms in the literature. Further, we assume that every firm is licensed in the coalition including the licensor. In the spirit of DMN, firms in the coalition including the licensor are allowed to cooperate to maximize the total payoff of the coalition they belong to, so some firms agree not to be licensed via sidepayments. We do not allow firms to cooperate also in this total surplus is greater than the number of existing non-licensees, each symmetric bargaining set for a coalition structure is a singleton and the optimal number of licensees that maximizes the licensor's revenue is uniquely determined. (V) When the grand coalition forms, the bargaining set coincides with the core, if the core is nonempty.
Our solutions are both defined in Aumann and Drèze (1974) . The bargaining set for a coalition structure is originally due to Davis and Maschler 3 TW gave a simpler interpretation to this definition: as a coalition firms can merge into a single entity or can operate a few (or all) of them and shut down the others. See section 5 for more detail.
(1967). 4 The sharp result (IV) is concisely derived from (III). We show in the Appendix that the complete characterization of bargaining sets for coalition structures would not give any clearer results. In the bargaining set family, the kernel or nucleolus (for a coalition structure) might have been chosen as our solution 5 . They are, however, based on measuring the cardinal complaints of coalitions to proposed payoffs, so represent "ethical" standards to possible bargaining outcomes. The "stable" profit sharing is to be the amount the players can obtain when no convincing objection can be made by any players. Note that, in this paper, neither objection nor counter objection is required to be stable in any sense. There are many variants of the bargaining set, some of which require that counter objections match several simultaneous objections. For each coalition structure, the bargaining set applied in this paper contains those bargaining sets as well as the core. 6 We show that such a bargaining set is a singleton for some coalition structures (result (IV)).
In the literature, linear demand and cost functions, Cournot or Bertrand oligopoly, cost-reducing or quality-improving technology, perfect or imperfect patent protection are assumed. 7 We analyze a much less specified model, i.e., a generalized patent licensing game. Instead, we retain the traditional assumption that all firms have an identical production technology before a patented technology is licensed and that every licensee firm of the patented technology can use the same technology. We hence confine our main concern to symmetric payoffs to licensee firms.
The outline of this paper is as follows. For better understanding our generalization of licensing games, section 2 gives a linear example that has been mainly analyzed in the literature. The recent literature is also reviewed in detail there. Section 3 formalizes the general licensing game and defines the solutions. Section 4 provides our main results and discuss the optimal 4 Aumann and Maschler (1964) originally defined the bargaining set for the grand coalition, but did not consider the bargaining set for a coalition structure explicitly.
5 See also Aumann and Drèze (1974) . The original definitions are due to Davis and Maschler (1965) and Schmeidler (1969) , respectively. 6 Many of those variants are empty for some games as well as the core. 7 Kamien, Tauman and Zhang (1988) studied patent licensing by means of fees for a new product. Muto (1987) considered a situation under resale-free.
number of licenses the licensor should sell through negotiations. Section 5 discusses the related works including characteristic functions that appeared in TW and DMN, where the other solutions are also briefly mentioned.
A Linear Example: Literature Review
In this section, we provide a patent licensing game that has been analyzed mainly in the literature and explain how and why we generalize it. In section 4, this linear example is referred some times. The developments in the literature that are referred in section 1 are also reviewed here.
There are n firms, 2 ≤ n < ∞, each producing an identical commodity.
The production cost per unit of output is c(> 0). Let q i be the output level produced by firm i. The market of the commodity is cleared at the price
, where a is a constant and c < a < ∞ is assumed. 8 An agent has the patent of a technology which reduces the unit cost of production from c to c − (> 0). 
which are summarized in the following order:
Regardless of the differences in the gross equilibrium profits of firms, this order is preserved in various patent licensing games with the other market structures including the Bertrand competition (with homogeneous good or differentiated goods) and the markets for new products.
In the literature, the amount F of upfront fee or the royalty rate r is determined so as to maximize the revenue of the licensor. After seminal papers noted in section 1, Kamien, Oren and Tauman (1992) showed that in the Cournot competition for a homogeneous good it is never optimal for the external licensor to license a cost-reducing technology by means of royalty only. Muto (1993) All these results are, however, derived under perfect patent protection.
As a nature of patented technology, the spillover (including piracy and resale) to non-licensees is inevitable. The above order of the gross equilibrium profits may not be necessarily preserved in the presence of some patterns of spillover. Moreover, it is difficult to expect which pattern of spillover actually occurs. Thus, we use neither the values of the equilibrium gross profits of firms nor the above order of them, but use only the following:
9 They also considered the case of incumbent licensor who has production ability. 10 It is remarkable that the two approaches asymptotically coincide, since the patent holder does not have full bargaining power in the cooperative approach and the Shapley value measures the fair contribution of the patent holder to the total industry profit. This is our generalization of patent licensing games that appeared in the literature. We allow sidepayments, so there is no substantial difference of payments between before and after the market competition. Our concern is hence the total payment to the licensor, so let δ = in W (s) and L(s). We briefly mention limited sidepayments in subsection 5.3.
A Generalized Patent Licensing Game

A Game with a Coalition Structure
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be the set of identical firms (producing a homogeneous good or differentiated goods) in this industry. An external licensor (not being a producer), denoted by player 0, has a patent of a (cost-reducing or quality-improving) technology. The set of players of this game is {0} ∪ N . 
as noted in section 2. 11 See Nakayama and Quintas (1991) for an asymmetric treatment of the firms' profits at the competition stage (iii). 12 The definition of v(S) from this pessimistic viewpoint plays no important role in the proofs of our propositions.
Given a set S ⊆ N of licensees, the permissible coalition structure is
, since any players in {0} ∪ S can communicate among them but non-licensees are not allowed to communicate among themselves, as noted in remark 1. The set of imputations for a permissible coalition structure P S is defined as
We hereafter consider only a subset S of licensees with S = ∅, since the licensor can guarantee the payoff zero by itself, i.e., x 0 ≥ v({0}) = 0 in X S for any S ⊆ N . Let ({0}∪N, v, P S ) be a game with a coalition structure P S , where all the vector of payoffs should be in X S . This is the game analyzed as the negotiation stage (ii). The solutions are defined in the next subsection.
The Solutions for Stable Profit Sharing
We apply two solutions to the game with a coalition structure defined above in order to figure out the bargaining outcomes as stable profit sharing.
First, the core for a coalition structure
is the subset of X S and defined as
We simply call C N the core. Note that it is easy to show that, for any S,
is the one defined in Aumann and Drèze (1974) . We specify the set X S of imputations for the permissible coalition structure P S taking into account the competitive stage (iii).
Next, we define the bargaining set for a coalition structure. Let i, j ∈ {0} ∪ S and x ∈ X S . We say that i has an objection (y, T ) against j at x
and that j has a counter objection (z, R)
We say that i has a valid objection (y, T ) against j at x if (y, T ) is not countered. The bargaining set for a coalition structure P S (of a game ({0} ∪ N, v, P S )) is also a subset of X S and defined as M S = {x ∈ X S |no player in {0} ∪ S has a valid objection at x}.
We simply call M N the bargaining set. This is the definition in Aumann and Drèze (1974), which is originally defined in Davis and Maschler (1967) . 13 In our model, any firms are identical before a patented technology is licensed, and the licensees are provided the same patented technology. So, we mainly consider symmetric payoffs to licensees. The symmetric solutions
remark 2: In the definitions of our solutions, the firms that do not belong to S cannot participate in the negotiations on license issues, but play a relevant role in determining the outside options of negotiators in {0} ∪ S.
The Main Results
The Cores for Coalition Structures
By the definitions, C S ⊆ M S for any S ⊆ N , if they are non-empty. If C S is non-empty for any S ⊆ N , we can predict stable profit sharing as bargaining outcomes more clearly by C S . We hence begin with considering the stronger solution C S . Unfortunately, however, our answer is negative.
To show this, the next lemma is helpful. This lemma is intuitively obvious by the definition of C S , so the proof is shown in the Appendix.
Lemma 1 For any
Finally,C S = ∅ implies C S = ∅ by Lemma 1.
Let s * be the number of licensees that maximizes their total surplus, i.e., 
Proof : We begin with the necessary and sufficient condition for C N = ∅.
Letting s = s * in the latter condition of (2) gives nW
. By the former condition of (2),
(if) Take x such that
Since s * = n, it is easily shown that x ∈C N .
When s * = n, the system (2) of inequalities implies 
The Bargaining Sets for Coalition Structures
When the solution is empty at the negotiation stage (ii), we cannot answer to our question on how many licenses the licensor should sell to firms through negotiations. Propositions 1 and 2 suggest that we consider the weaker solution M S to predict stable profit sharing in our patent licensing game. In contrast to the cores for coalition structures, the bargaining set for coalition structures are all non-empty, which was shown by Peleg (1967) .
Let us hereafter confine our attention toM S . It is not unnatural to focus on the symmetric payoffs to identical licensees, since they have the same technologies both before and after licensed. Then, it suffices to examine objections and counter objections of the licensor and a licensee i ∈ S.
Maschler and Peleg (1966) indirectly implies thatM S = ∅ for any S ⊆ N . 15 We first show the upper and lower bounds of x 0 inM S , where S = N , in the next proposition.
Proposition 3 Let x ∈M S with S = N . Then, we have the following.
where W * be the minimum of W that satisfies the inequality s(
). 15 They actually showed that the kernels for coalition structures are all non-empty, which allocate symmetric payoffs to identical players. 
Lemma 2 For any
If the licensor had a counter objection (z, {0} ∪ T ) to the objection with 
Lemma 3 Suppose n/2 ≤ s < n. If x ∈M S , thenx ≤ L(0).
Proof : Supposex > L(0). Take an objection (y, {0} ∪ T ) of the licensor against firm i ∈ S in x such that |T | = |S|, T ⊇ N \ S and
Since
firm i ∈ S has no counter objection to the objection, contradicting that
When each of s licensees obtainsx = L(0) as the upper bound of its payoff, the licensor's profit sharing is at least s(W (s) − sL(0)). So is in the next case.
Lemma 4 Suppose
is no counter objection to the objection, contradicting that x ∈M S .
In the next case, each of s licensees obtains at most W * , so the licensor obtains at least s(W (s) − W * ). 
Lemma 5 Suppose 1 ≤ s ≤ n/2 and s(
, the licensor can make an objection (y, {0} ∪ S * ) such that
Thus,x ≤ L(0). Lemma 2 completes the proof of (a).
Next, we show (b) with the following lemma.
Lemma 6 If x ∈M S * , thenx ≥ L(0).
If the licensor had a counter objection (z, {0} ∪ R) to the objection
which violates the definition of s * . Thus, i's objection (y, N ) cannot be countered by the licensor, contradicting that x ∈M S * .
there is {0} ∪ T with x 0 + i∈T x i < tW (t), where t < n. Let (y, {0} ∪ T )
be an objection of the licensor against some i ∈ N \ T in x such that
Sincex ≥ L(0), i has no counter objection, contradicting that x ∈M S .
Thus,M N =C N .
Let S * be a set S ⊆ N with |S| = s * . Proposition 3 (b) directly implies the next proposition.
Proposition 5
If n/2 ≤ s * < n, thenM S * = {x * }, where
Proposition 5 says that, if the number of licensees that maximizes their total surplus is greater than the number of existing non-licensees, each symmetric bargaining set for a coalition structure is a singleton. It is easy to confirm that the number s * of firms increases as the patented cost-reducing technology becomes smaller in the Cournot market.
The next proposition ensures that x * is a stable profit sharing if S = S * .
Proposition 6 x * ∈M S * .
Proof : Consider any objection (y, {0} ∪ T ) of the licensor against a licensee
, which violates the definition of s * . If k∈T y k < tL(0), firm i can make a counter objection (z, N ) to the objection made by the licensor such that
Hence, no valid objection can be made by the licensor against any firm in x * .
Next consider any objection (u , R) of a firm i ∈ S * against the licensor
Arrange the payoffs of all the firms in non-decreasing order. Take the first s * (< n) firms and let Q be the set of them. Since k∈Q u k ≤ s * L(0), the licensor can make a counter objection to the objection. Hence, no valid objection can be made by any licensee against the licensor in x * .
The Optimal Number of Licenses: Implications
This subsection considers the optimal number of licenses. First, we consider it as the licensor's choice at invitation stage (i) to complete our analysis.
Next, we discuss the latest non-cooperative result by Sen and Tauman (2007) from our viewpoint.
Recall the bargaining outcomes at stage (ii) derived as our propositions.
Lemma 2 implies that in any stable profit sharing the licensor can never obtain more than s * (W (s * ) − L(0)) as its revenue under any permissible coalition structures. On the other hand, Proposition 5 suggests that if n/2 ≤ s * < n, the revenue of the licensor's is uniquely determined as
the licensor should invite s * (< n) firms to the negotiation and license its patented technology to them. The stable profit sharing is completely specified in this case.
In the other cases, however, we cannot completely determine the optimal number of licenses, sinceM S * may not be a singleton. Proposition 6 indicates that the licensor may obtain s * (W (s * ) − L(0)) as negotiation results, but it is not guaranteed. When s * = n, in particular, it might be better for the licensor not to invite all the firms to the negotiation, if the collective bargaining power of firms is large; it might be better for it to invite n − 1 firms to the negotiations if (n − 1)(
One may think we could specify the stable profit sharing in our generalized patent licensing game by characterizing the bargaining sets for coalition structure P S * in the case of 1 ≤ s * ≤ n/2. Unfortunately, however, we cannot make clearer our propositions. (See the Appendix.)
Next, we briefly mention the optimal number of licenses derived as the latest non-cooperative result. In the linear example described in section 2, Sen and Tauman (2007) suggest that, in the subgame perfect equilibrium, the licensor sell the license to at leastŝ − 1 (n − 1 ifŝ = n) firms (n ≥ 3) under the optimal combination of fee and royalty, where the fee is charged by means of auction, and that the net profit of every licensee is then the Cournot profit L(ŝ − 1, δ) of a non-licensee. They seem to give an answer to the open question that has not been completed for about two decades since Tauman (1984, 1986) . This is the point which is required of our solutions as well as coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (a noncooperative solution).
Final Remarks
Finally, we argue three points as final remarks. One is on characteristic functions, another is on the Shapley value studied in the related literature, and the other is on a solution for a more generalized model. The latter two remarks propose the topics for future research.
Other Characteristic Functions
The characteristic function we defined in subsection 3.1 does not necessarily exhibit super-additivity often presumed in the cooperative analysis. We say
for all coalitions S and T with S ∩ T = ∅. The super-additivity is the feature of characteristic functions required in analyzing how to distribute the total payoff in the grand coalition, since the grand coalition may not actually form without it. In fact, Aumann and Drèze (1974) did not require it for analysis of games with coalition structures, although they devoted one section to the super-additive cover of a characteristic function and its application to the core. 16 It is, however, worth considering our characteristic function in comparison to other ones used in TW and DMN.
In this paper, we prohibit firms from forming any cartel in the market. This is the assumption to consider the same situation as the one in the non-cooperative analysis in the literature. A coalition is hence regarded as merely a group within which communication among its members is allowed. This is one of the causes of our characteristic function being not necessarily guaranteed the super-additivity. The worth of coalition S is defined in the same way. TW showed that the maxmin value coincide with the minmax value for any set S of firms. The maxmin or minmax approach itself is a well-known way to derive status quo points in two-person bargaining problems from non-cooperative games. This characteristic functionṽ exhibits the super-additivity. Thus, we can see that prohibiting any cartel in the market causes our characteristic function v not necessarily to be super-additive. As noted in section 1, however, we need this assumption to consider the same situation as analyzed with non-cooperative mechanisms in the literature, since our aim is to seek into the original and practical viewpoint that licensing agreements as bargaining outcomes.
On the other hand, we can retain super-additivity even if firms do not form any cartel. That is the characteristic function applied in DMN to a game of information trading. In the context of patent licensing, a patented technology is licensed in the most efficient way among a seller and potential buyers of that technology, i.e.,
in the notation of TW. Let t * be the maximizer of tW (
t) + (s − t)L(t).
According to this definition ofv, a patented technology is not necessarily licensed to all the potential buyers in coalition S , whereas s −t * non-buyers share the total profit of their coalition through sidepayments in reward for their cooperation for efficient sharing of a patented technology. They would, however, face a disadvantage when another patented technology is innovated after the game currently played: since they do not have the currently latest technology, they would suffer from lack of that technology even if newly innovated technology is licensed to them. So, we did not usev.
The Shapley Value
Aumann and Drèze (1974) defined the Shapley value for a coalition structure as well as the other solutions and provided a set of axioms that characterizes the value. In the linear example in section 2, we can find a case where the Shapley value for a coalition structure is not a stable profit sharing.
It is well known that the Shapley value is not necessarily in the core, but its relationship with the bargaining set has not been studied comprehensively. This is left for a future research.
Limitation of Sidepayments
We could have analyzed an alternative model where sidepayments are not allowed except payments to the licensor: for any S ⊆ N , each licensee i ∈ {0} ∪ S pays p to the licensor as the upfront fee when licensed and there is no money transfer among firms in S. Even with these limited sidepayments, almost the same results are regained, so sidepayments do not play any important role in our propositions.
With sidepayments, however, licensing by means of royalty only is not substantially different from licensing by means of upfront fee only. Hence, it is interesting to analyze the patent licensing game with limited sidepayments, which leads us to reconsider the traditional questions on "fee versus royalty" or "the optimal combination of upfront fee and royalty" from the original and practical viewpoint taken in this paper. We will show the complete results with limited sidepayments in another paper. 
there is no counter objection that can be made by any licensee i ∈ S. Given a coalition structure P S , denote by Θ(R) a set of all the r's each of which 
